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This  study  investigates  how  profit  redistribution  affects  the  performance  of  firms 
affiliated  to  business  groups.  It  shows  that  inefficient  profit  redistribution  causes 
group-affiliated  firms  to  perform  poorly  relative  to  independent  firms.  This 
underperformance  persists  even  after  controlling  for  other  explanations  such  as 
diversification and  resource  transfers to unlisted firms.  The  study also  shows that 
profit  redistribution  is  more  pronounced  for  groups  of  larger  size  and  greater 
corporate  control.  The  results  of  the  study  lend  support  for  the  inefficient  profit 
redistribution explanation of the ‘business group discount’. 
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1. Introduction 
The  organizational  form  of  business  groups  is  widely  prevalent  in  many 
developed economies and most emerging markets. An extensive body of literature has 
examined Japanese Keiretsus (Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1995; 
Lincoln,  Gerlach  and  Ahmadjian,  1996;  Hoshi  and  Kashyap,  2001;  Gramlich, 
Limpaphayom and Rhee, 2004). In Europe, Bianco and Casavola (1999),  Perotti and 
Gelfer (2001), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Buysschaert, Deloof and Jegers (2004) 
document the presence of business groups in several countries including Belgium, 
France, Italy, Russia and Sweden. Among the emerging economies, Bae, Kang and 
Kim (2002), Joh (2003) and Baek, Kang and Park (2004) study Korean Chaebols, 
Keister (2000) investigates Chinese business groups, and Khanna and Palepu (2000a, 
2000b) provide evidence from India and Chile. Two recent cross-country studies by 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) and Claessens, Fan and Lang (2002) further attest to the 
ubiquitous nature of business groups in emerging economies. 
An  important feature of a business group is  that it can exploit its internal 
capital market by redistributing financial resources across firms. Resource transfers 
take place in many different ways varying from transfer prices, loans at non-market 
interest  rates,  new  equity  issues  and  asset  sales  to  the  extreme  form  of  cash 
appropriation. Since it is very hard  to verify such practices, one can only use an 
indirect approach to measure these transfers. Moreover, redistribution of resources 
can also affect the performance of group-affiliated firms. The purpose of this study is 
to provide empirical evidence on these issues.   2   
A widely cited study by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), hereafter 
BMM,  explores  the  effect  of  resource  transfers  by  controlling  shareholders  of 
business groups. Our study complements their study in several ways. BMM consider 
one-way resource transfers from firms lower down the pyramid to those higher up the 
pyramid, whereas we analyze the effect of resource transfers across firms regardless 
of  their  position  in  the  pyramid.  Moreover,  resource  transfer  in  our  study  is  not 
restricted to pyramidal structures only, but also applicable to firms with cross share 
holdings. BMM analyze the prevalence of tunneling resources among group-affiliated 
firms, whereas our study also incorporates the phenomenon of negative tunneling (or 
propping):  the  possibility  of  lower  performing  or  loss-making  firms  receiving 
transfers thereby benefiting even the minority shareholders of these firms. 
In addition to documenting redistribution of resources among group-affiliated 
firms, we relate it with the extent of control exercised by controlling shareholders. 
Claessens,  Djankov,  Fan and  Lang  (2002) document that  in a business group the 
influence of controlling shareholders on firm performance varies with the degree of 
control. We examine if higher levels of control result in the controlling shareholders 
possessing greater opportunities to redistribute profits. Furthermore, we investigate 
the influence of the size of the business group on the process of profit redistribution. 
This is important because groups consisting of a larger number of firms could be more 
prone to the phenomenon of profit redistribution. 
Finally,  we  investigate whether  profit  redistribution  among  group-affiliated 
firms takes place efficiently i.e. resources are transferred to more profitable firms, or 
inefficiently  i.e.  deserving  group  firms  are  starved  of  new  investments  while  less 
deserving  group  firms  are  subsidized.  In  the  former  case,  significant  positive   3   
differences in capital expenditures between high and low performing firms should 
exist, whereas in the latter case no such difference should be observed. The efficiency 
or inefficiency of the redistribution process ultimately plays a vital role in determining 
the over or under performance of group-affiliated firms. 
We  analyze  these  issues  using  a  large  sample  of  group-affiliated  and 
independent  Indian  firms.  Indian  business  groups  present  an  interesting  staging 
ground  for  empirical  analysis  due  to  various  reasons.  Business  groups  are  well 
defined in India. Each firm is typically a member of only one corporate group, and 
there are very few mergers between firms belonging to different groups. In many 
other countries, on the other hand, the classification of firms into groups is not clear-
cut. Another appealing aspect is that there is a prevalence of a large number of both 
group-affiliated  and  unaffiliated  listed  firms  in  India.  This  feature  enables  us  to 
perform a statistically reliable comparison between these two categories of firms. It is 
in contrast to many other countries where a substantial proportion of listed firms are 
affiliated with large business groups only. Finally, with the country in the second 
decade  of  an  ongoing  liberalization  process, many  of  the erstwhile  polices  which 
tended  to  favor  group-affiliated  firms  have  been  progressively  dismantled.  This 
necessitates an up-to-date analysis of these two competing organizational structures 
(group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms). 
Resource transfers  within  the  internal  capital market  of  business  groups  is 
comparable to those of conglomerates which has received attention in recent literature 
(Billet and Mauer, 2003). Yet, there exist some important differences between these 
two  organizational  forms.  A  conglomerate  firm  typically  owns  several  divisions, 
while  a  business  group  is  a  collection  of  legally  independent  firms  with  distinct   4   
shareholdings.  Firms  usually  decide  whether  to  extend  operations  into  multiple 
industries whereas firms cannot decide whether to join a business group or even leave 
a business group. As mentioned by Lins and Servaes (2002), a firm’s group-affiliation 
is basically fixed as it does not change over time. Finally, empirical evaluation of the 
performance  of  separate  (non-traded)  divisions  of  conglomerate  firms  requires 
estimation of imputed values. This imputed valuation approach has been subject to 
criticism  owing  to  sample  selection  bias.  On  the  other  hand,  an  investigation  of 
performance of firms affiliated to a business group does not require calculation of 
imputed values. Group-affiliated firms are separate entities, many of which are also 
quoted on a stock exchange. The financial information pertaining to these firms is also 
audited and disclosed regularly. This yields a potentially rich source of financial data 
that can be usefully employed to determine performance of these individual firms in a 
relatively unbiased manner. 
The results of this study can be summarized as follows. First, we observe that 
group-affiliated firms  significantly  under-perform  independent firms.  The  result  is 
robust to alternative performance measures and differences in group size. The extent 
of underperformance is also economically significant. Our results show that group-
affiliated firms experience a decline in return on assets (ROA) of 3 - 5% (in a sample 
where the mean ROA is almost 14%) and a reduction in the average value of Q of 17 - 
20% (in a sample where the mean Q is 1.25). Second, we document the existence of 
profit redistribution among group-affiliated firms. We find that group firms exhibiting 
a higher level of performance subsequently undergo a lower level of performance, and 
vice versa. The phenomenon of profit redistribution persists even after controlling for 
the presence of unlisted firms in the group. Third, we show that the extent of profit 
redistribution  is  influenced  by  the  degree  of  control  exercised  by  the  controlling   5   
shareholders as well as the size of the business group. Higher levels of controlling 
shareholder ownership and larger group  size result in greater  profit  redistribution. 
Fourth, we document inefficient profit redistribution occurring among group-affiliated 
firms.  We  analyze  capital  expenditures  of  firms  and  observe  that  resources  are 
transferred  from  more  deserving  firms  to  less  deserving  firms.  Our  evidence  on 
inefficient cross-subsidization among group firms offers an explanation for the earlier 
observed  ‘business  group  discount’.  This  result  remains  robust  to  alternative 
explanations of underperformance of group-affiliated firms like diversification and 
resource transfers to unlisted firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. The next 
section presents a brief discussion of business groups and, in particular, those in India. 
Subsequently, we develop the hypotheses and illustrate the methodology and the data 
used  in  the  study.  We  then  present  the  results  of  our  study  and  provide  some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Business groups 
Business or corporate groups are a collection of legally independent firms with 
some commonality of ownership and management by family members. The family 
members who control a business group can do so through any or a combination of the 
following devices: dual-class shares, pyramids and cross-shareholdings.
1 These three 
mechanisms usually enable controlling shareholders to maintain a complete lock on 
                                                 
1 Non-equity sources of exercising control such as interlocking directorates are also employed by some 
groups. 
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the control of a company while holding less than a majority of the cash flow rights 
associated with its equity.
2 
Business  groups  are  characterized  by  diverse  features.  Khanna  (2000)  and 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) provide a detailed exposition of these features prevalent in 
different countries. Strachan (1976) points out that although some features like family 
ties,  geographical  ties  and  interlocking  directorates  tend  to  be  common  among 
business groups, the key characteristics that distinguish a full fledged business group 
from  other  types  of  organizations  are  diversity  of  affiliated  firms,  coalition  of 
individuals and families, and binding relationship. Leff (1978) suggests that members 
of business groups are linked by interpersonal trust that is formed on the basis of a 
similar personal, ethnic or communal background. 
Business groups in India used to depict caste and provincial origins. Most of 
these traditional groups come from the trading communities (e.g. banias) and their 
initial activities can be traced back to certain parts of the country, although, in more 
recent  times  some  of  the  larger  groups  have  assumed  a  pan-Indian  operational 
character. Groups increased the number of companies under their fold when assets 
belonging  to  the  erstwhile  British  companies  were  acquired.  Traditionally,  the 
management of most of these groups was via the managing agency system. Under this 
system, each of the participating firms signs a management contract with a managing 
agency which is owned by the group itself. Several of the largest business groups in 
India like the Tatas and the Birlas were initially run by managing agencies owned by 
them. However, this system of managing groups has only historical relevance as the 
                                                 
2 However, the degree and tightness of control exerted among these three mechanisms differ, and are 
modeled in Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000). Pyramids for instance, regardless of whether they 
are coupled with dual-class shares, result in voting rights being concentrated in the hands of a single 
company  or shareholder, while with cross-shareholdings,  the  voting rights are distributed  over the 
entire group.   7   
managing agency system was abolished in 1969 as a consequence of amendments in 
the statute governing corporations in India. In more recent times, control over group 
firms is exercised through inter-corporate equity investments, holding companies and 
interlocking directorates. 
The identification of business group firms in India can be done with a high 
degree of accuracy because firms publicly  disclose  their affiliation  to a particular 
group. The information is revealed in annual reports and/or filings with regulatory 
authorities. Like many other countries, business group membership in India is also 
exogenous. Firms are not free to join a particular group. Despite the institution of a 
takeover code in the 1990s that facilitates mergers and acquisitions, the practice of 
group  firms  interchanging  group  affiliations  is  relatively  uncommon.  Another 
remarkable feature is that of diversity of Indian business groups. The largest groups 
are  active  in  a  wide  variety  of  sectors,  ranging  from  automobile  production  to 
educational publishing. They cover vast tracts of the industrial sector and contribute 
to a significant chunk of the country’s industrial output. On the other hand, the bulk of 
the business groups can be categorized as small and medium sized, with the scale and 
scope  of  their  activities  being  considerably  modest.  Whereas  many  prior  studies 
confine the analysis to the few largest business groups (like big-6 Keiretsus in Japan, 
top-30 Chaebols in Korea), we examine all business groups. A final important feature 
of Indian business groups is that they are not centered on a financial intermediary. 
Unlike Japanese Keiretsu firms, banks are not both creditors and major shareholders 
of Indian group firms.   8   
3. Hypotheses 
3.1. Performance of business groups 
Similar to conglomerates, business groups are associated with benefits and 
costs  which  predominantly  accrue  as  a  consequence  of  the  operation  of  internal 
capital market. The benefits emanate from the bright side of the operations of the 
internal capital market where groups can help firms that have difficulties in obtaining 
financing  from  the  external  capital  market  (Gertner,  Scharfstein  and  Stein,  1994; 
Stein,  1997;  Claessens,  Fan  and  Lang,  2002).  Groups  can  allocate  resources 
efficiently to more deserving firms by transferring funds away from slow growing, 
cash  generating  firms  to  those  that  are  expanding  rapidly  but  need  new  funds. 
Business  groups  also  provide  co-insurance  benefits  derived  from  increased  debt 
capacity  and  reduction  of  bankruptcy  costs.  Prowse  (1992)  argues  that  group-
affiliated firms help other firms that suffer from adverse economic conditions in order 
to ensure group’s long-term survival. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) argue that business 
groups in emerging countries generate added value by imitating beneficial functions 
of several institutions that are prevalent in many advanced countries. Groups can also 
reduce  informational  asymmetry  problems  and  can  raise  funds  from  the  external 
capital  market  relatively  more  easily  and  at  a  lower  cost  than  independent  firms. 
Gramlich et al. (2004) document that business groups enable high tax-rate member 
firms  to  shift  income  to  affiliates  with  relatively  low  tax-rates.  Finally,  group-
affiliated firms can benefit from increased economies of scale, operating synergies 
and market power. 
Other studies, on the other hand, argue that there are relatively more costs than 
benefits  associated  with  business  groups.  Group-affiliated  firms  suffer  from  the   9   
consequences of the dark side of the internal capital market (Shin and Stulz, 1998; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; and Rajan et al., 2000). A significant portion of costs also 
comes  from  increased  agency  problems  and  conflicts  of  interest  leading  to 
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders of business groups 
(Claessens,  Djankov  and  Lang,  2000;  Joh,  2003).  In  addition,  Johnson,  La  Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) argue that controlling shareholders in a business 
group  can  adopt  certain  practices  of  tunneling  corporate  resources  for  their  own 
benefits which are detrimental to the minority shareholders as well as the value of the 
individual firm. Business group firms may also engage in over-investments of free 
cash flows in other firms (Shin and Park, 1999; Ferris, Kim and Kitsabunnarat, 2003). 
The empirical evidence examining the impact of these benefits and costs on 
the performance of group-affiliated firms is also mixed. Chang and Hong (2000) find 
that  Chaebol-affiliated  firms  in  Korea  show  higher  performance  than  unaffiliated 
firms.  Khanna  and  Rivkin  (2001)  in  a  cross-country  study  of  fourteen  emerging 
markets find that in some economies group affiliation is positively associated with 
performance while for others the effect is either negative or insignificant. Lins and 
Servaes  (2002),  on  the  other  hand,  in  a  cross-country  study  of  seven  emerging 
economies, document lower performance for firms associated with industrial groups. 
Campbell and Keys (2002), Ferris et al. (2003) and Joh (2003) find that South Korean 
Chaebols exhibit lower performance compared to unaffiliated firms. While Khanna 
and  Palepu  (2000a)  find  that  the  largest  and the  most  diversified  Indian  business 
groups  exert  a  significant  positive  influence  on  firm  performance,  they  find  a   10   
significant negative influence on firm performance for firms belonging to small and 
intermediate sized groups.
3 
Overall, both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that the 
consequence  of  the  associated  benefits  and  costs  of  group  affiliation  on  firm 
performance  is  difficult  to  predict  a  priori.  Therefore,  we  propose  the  following 
hypothesis: 
H1: The benefits (costs) associated with group affiliation outweigh the 
costs  (benefits),  and  consequently,  group-affiliated  firms  over  (under) 
perform unaffiliated firms. 
 
3.2. Profit redistribution in business groups 
 
The presence of an internal capital market in a business group can lead to 
resources of one firm being transferred to fund operations of another affiliated firm. 
Redistribution takes place because there is a real need for new investments for firms 
that do not have any other means to get adequate resources. Redistribution can also 
occur  because  of  the  benefits  accruing  to  controlling  shareholders  (and  family 
members) and the principle of solidarity within the business group to keep struggling 
firms afloat. Another reason for profit redistribution is put forward by Gramlich et al. 
(2004).  They  argue  that  business  groups  will  engage  in  income-shifting  activities 
among  affiliated  firms  in  order  to  benefit  from  reduced  combined  tax  liabilities. 
Fisman and Khanna (2004) emphasize a related argument for redistribution. They 
                                                 
3 These small and intermediate sized group firms actually constitute the bulk of their sample (as much 
as ninety percent of Indian group firms).  
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argue  that  business  groups  in  some  developing  countries  try  to  benefit  from 
transferring  profits  to  its  affiliates  located  in  underdeveloped  regions  that  receive 
preferential incentives and tax shields from the government. Cestone and Fumagalli 
(2005) propose that business groups can channel funds to an affiliated firm in order to 
help  it  compete  more  aggressively  than  other  rival  firms  in  the  industry. 
Redistribution is thus considered as a necessary response to changes taking place in a 
group-affiliated firm’s competitive environment.  
These  arguments  clearly  suggest  that  business  groups  espouse  profit 
redistribution  by  transferring  resources  from  highly  profitable firms  to  firms  with 
lower profitability. Although no one casts doubt on resource transfers regularly taking 
place within a business group, there exists no hard evidence of this phenomenon. 
Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that transfers made by groups encompass assets being 
moved out of firms, profits being siphoned off firms and troubled firms being propped 
up. Bertrand et al. (2002) also note that cash resources can be transferred across firms 
in many ways: firms can give each other high (or low) interest rate loans, manipulate 
transfer prices, sell assets to each other at above or below market prices, etc. Any 
empirical analysis to quantify redistribution activities is practically an impossible task 
because firms carry out these activities in a subtle manner without making any public 
announcement or disclosing these in annual reports. 
An indirect way to detect these transfers is to use the methodology employed 
by Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian (1996) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002). They 
argue that the outcome of the redistribution process is such that highly profitable 
firms  will  subsequently  experience  lower  profitability  while  firms  with  low   12   
profitability  will  subsequently  benefit.  Accordingly,  we  propose  the  following 
hypothesis: 
H2: For group-affiliated firms, profit redistribution entails that firms with 
higher (lower) prior profitability will suffer (gain). 
 
Larger corporate groups are usually involved in a wide range of industries. 
The differences in individual firm sizes and the wide dispersion of industries in which 
they  operate  could  result  in  a  greater  variance  in  inter-firm  profitability  of  larger 
business  groups.  On  the  other  hand,  business  groups  emphasize  profit  stability 
because it ensures their long-term survival (Nakatani, 1984; Prowse, 1992; Ferris et 
al., 2003). It is, therefore, more likely that larger business groups engage in more 
profit redistribution in order to minimize or smoothen differences in individual firm 
profitability. Larger groups may also consist of more unlisted firms which depend on 
internal group resources to meet their capital requirements. This in turn leads to a 
higher probability that capital will be redistributed to a greater extent among firms in 
larger business groups. 
Larger business groups could also include firms with more nebulous ties to the 
controlling  family.  Since  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  the  degree  of  profit 
redistribution is influenced by the extent of family control, it would be prudent to 
account for this fact. It is widely known that family members in a business group 
exercise  more  control  by  means  of  their  shareholdings  in  other  group  firms. 
Therefore, we expect the profit redistribution effect to be stronger for firms affiliated 
to higher levels of corporate control.   13   
Consequently, our third hypothesis is the following: 
H3:  For  group-affiliated  firms,  the  degree  of  profit  redistribution  is 
influenced by the size of the group and the extent of corporate control of 
these firms. 
 
3.3. (In)efficiency of profit redistribution 
So far, we focused on profit redistribution in business groups and linked it 
with some important characteristics of business groups like group-size and corporate 
control.  In  this  section,  we  examine  whether  profit  redistribution  is  efficient  i.e. 
resources are shifted to more profitable firms, or inefficient i.e. resources are diverted 
to less profitable firms. When the resource allocation mechanism works efficiently 
among  group-affiliated  firms,  groups  transfer  resources  from  firms  with  poor 
investment opportunities to firms with good investment opportunities. This will imply 
that there should be a significant positive difference in capital expenditures between 
high and low performing firms. On the other hand, inefficiencies will be apparent if 
deserving group firms are not receiving their due as far as investments are concerned, 
while less deserving group firms are subsidized. Therefore, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: For group-affiliated firms, efficient profit redistribution entails that 
capital expenditures  of high  performing  firms  will  be  higher  than  low 
performing firms. 
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4. Methodology 
In  order  to  test  if  group-affiliated  firms  are  more  or  less  profitable  than 
unaffiliated firms, we estimate the following specification using ordinary least squares 
regression: 
Performance i, t = a  Group + d Xi, t +  ei, t.      (1) 
The dependent variable is a measure of performance of firm i in period t. 
Following  prior  literature,  we  consider  both  accounting  and  stock  market-based 
performance measures. The first measure is return on assets (ROA) defined as the 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation over the book value of total assets. 
The second measure is Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
total debt over book value of total assets. 
The main explanatory variable of interest is Group which is a dummy variable 
that  takes  on  the  value  of  one  when  a  firm  is  affiliated  with  a  group,  and  zero 
RWKHUZLVH 7KH HVWLPDWHG FRHIILFLHQW  measures the impact of group affiliation. If 
JURXS DIILOLDWLRQ FDXVHV ILUP SHUIRUPDQFH WR GHFOLQH WKHQ  VKRXOG EH QHJDWLYH
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) argue that the overall performance of a business group is 
influenced by the size of the group. Therefore, in a separate specification, we analyze 
the effect of group size by dividing groups into three size categories: Group1 (groups 
with one or two listed firms), Group2 (groups with three or four listed firms) and 
Group3 (groups with five or more listed firms).
4 
                                                 
4  We  also  perform  several  robustness  checks  using  alternative  definitions  of  group-size:  dummies 
representing groups with up to four listed firms versus groups with five or more listed firms; dummies 
representing total number of both listed and unlisted firms; and logarithm of total number of listed and 
unlisted firms in the group.   15   
We include a vector of additional control variables (Xi,t) that influence firm 
performance.  This  vector  comprises  ownership,  firm  size,  firm  age,  leverage  and 
industry  affiliation.  Several  ownership  categories  are  used  in  various parts  of  our 
empirical analysis to control for the effect of ownership on performance. We define 
these variables by calculating the percentage of total outstanding common shares held 
by  different  categories  of  investors.  Three  important  variables  are  first  used  to 
represent the percentage of a company’s outstanding common shares held by financial 
institutions  (FINI),  non-financial  corporations  (CORP),  and  directors  and  their 
relatives (DIR). Earlier studies (e.g. Chibber and Majumdar, 1999) have shown the 
importance  of  distinguishing  between  domestic  and  foreign  shareholders  in  an 
emerging  market  context.  The  performance  impact  of  these  shareholders  can  be 
different  at  a  disaggregated  level.  Therefore,  we  construct  separate  ownership 
variables  by  decomposing  aggregate  ownership  into  its  major  components: 
shareholdings  by  foreign  non-financial  corporations  (FORC),  shareholdings  by 
foreign  financial  institutions  (FORI),  shareholdings  by  domestic  non-financial 
corporations (DOMC) and shareholdings by domestic financial institutions (DOMI). 
As control over group firms by the family is exercised primarily through other 
group  firms  which  is  reflected  through  shareholdings  by  domestic  corporations 
(DOMC),  we  examine  this  variable  more  closely  by  decomposing  it  into  three 
separate  variables:  domestic  corporate  shareholding  of  less  than  26%  (DOMC1); 
domestic corporate shareholding of 26% and above but less than 51% (DOMC2); and 
domestic corporate shareholding of 51% and above (DOMC3).
5 This classification 
                                                 
5 The rationale for choosing these ownership thresholds is that they constitute critical levels as far as 
control over a firm is exercised. A shareholding of 26% enables one to block a special resolution that is 
required to effect crucial decisions relating to changing the line of business, reduction in share capital, 
mergers, etc. This effectively means that a shareholder wishing to radically change the nature of the 
firm has to garner the support of 75% of the shareholding of the firm for the proposal to be approved.   16   
enables us to determine the performance impact on group firms due to escalating 
thresholds of group control over its firms. 
The second test performed in this study is that of the profit redistribution effect 
(Hypothesis 2). A group-affiliated firm generating higher cash flows may be required 
to transfer these resources to another affiliated firm that lacks adequate cash flows. 
The  consequence  of  this  transfer  will  be  that  a  highly  profitable  firm  will 
subsequently exhibit a reduction in its profit while a low profitability group firm will 
subsequently benefit. Lincoln et al. (1996) argue that in order to ascertain a significant 
effect on profitability, the length of the time period in which performance is measured 
should be long enough for a transfer to occur and its economic impact to become 
apparent.  For  example,  if  redistribution  involves  channeling  funds  for  new 
investments in a firm, then it will require a considerable amount of time before the 
impact of it on the operating performance of that firm is discernible. Accordingly, we 
consider a time period of one year to be reasonably long enough in order to detect any 
effect of profit redistribution.
6 
The  profit  redistribution  process  is  facilitated  by  the  extent  of  control 
exercised  by  the  group’s  controlling  shareholders.  We  use  domestic  corporate 
shareholdings as a proxy for the extent of control because it primarily represents inter-
corporate shareholdings of the group. A phenomenon like profit redistribution is not 
expected to occur among independent firms. Therefore, we estimate the following 
regression specification for group-affiliated firms only:  
                                                                                                                                           
There exists an unambiguous devolution of property rights at a shareholding level of 51% and the 
ability  to  pass  ordinary  resolutions.  We  also  perform  a  robustness  check  using  an  alternative 
classification involving two domestic corporate thresholds: DOMC less than 51%, and DOMC of 51% 
and above. 
 
6 One can argue that the effect of profit redistribution can also be examined using semi-annual data. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevents us from doing such an analysis.    17   
Performance i, t = a + l Performance i, t-1 +  f Control i, t * Performance i, t-1 
+  d X i, t +  e i, t.      (2) 
The profit redistribution effect is empirically captured through the coefficient 
f of the interaction term: Control i, t * Performance i, t-1. A negative value of f implies 
that higher performance of a group-affiliated firm in one period (which is used by the 
controlling shareholders to reallocate resources to some other affiliated firms that lack 
these  resources)  is  followed  by  lower  performance  in  the  subsequent  period. 
Specification  (2)  includes  several  control  variables  to  account  for  differences  in 
corporate ownership, firm size, firm age, leverage, diversification, number of unlisted 
firms and industry affiliations. 
Probing deeper into the phenomenon of profit redistribution, a question that is 
of considerable interest is whether redistribution among group firms is greater with 
larger group size and higher levels of corporate control (Hypothesis 3). To investigate 
this, we employ the following specification: 
Performance i, t   =   a   +    åk   Group Size  +  l Performance i, t-1 
+ ål j Control i, t * Performance i, t-1  
+  åk ål f Control i, t * Performance i, t-1* Group Size 
+ d X i, t  +   e i, t.            (3) 
 
where the summation subscripts k and l denote three group size dummies and control 
thresholds,  respectively.  The  explanatory  variable  Control  includes  three  different 
levels  of  domestic  non-financial  corporate  shareholdings.  Similarly,  the  variable 
Group Size includes three group size categories. These variables form the basis for a   18   
set of interactions terms that are employed to determine the joint effect of the degree 
of corporate control and the extent of group size on profit redistribution. In order to 
test Hypothesis 3, we focus on the coefficient of the interaction term representing the 
highest level of corporate control and the largest group size. 
  The  fourth  hypothesis  is  concerned  with  the  efficient  allocation  of  profits 
among firms affiliated to a group. To examine this, we divide both group and non-
group firms on the basis of Q and compare the levels of capital expenditures of these 
two categories of firms. If profit redistribution takes place efficiently, then high Q 
group  firms  are  more  likely  to  receive  additional  funds.  This  will  be  reflected  in 
capital expenditures of high Q firms being significantly higher than that of low Q 
firms. On the other hand, in case of inefficient profit redistribution, we would expect 
either no such difference or high Q group firms receiving significantly lower capital 
expenditures in comparison to low Q group firms. 
5. Data 
The  data  come  from  a  database  called  “Capitaline  2000”  which  contains 
balance sheet, income statement and ownership information for a large number of 
Indian listed companies. For this study, we analyze firms listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange, which is the oldest, and one of the two main stock exchanges operating in 
India.  Prior  published  studies  related  to  India  also  use  the  stocks  listed  on  this 
exchange for their analysis. We eliminate financial, utility, real estate, trading and 
government firms (defined as firm with a total government holding of 50 percent and 
more) from our sample. We also drop those firms that are subsidiaries of foreign firms 
(defined as firm with a total foreign shareholding of fifty percent and above). This   19   
precludes any ambiguity in identifying Indian firms and enhances the validity of our 
analysis of group-affiliated firms. 
The  database  clearly  identifies  firms  that  are  affiliated  to  a  group.  The 
identification  of  business  groups  in  India  is  relatively  easy  and  non-controversial 
because firms are usually members of only one group. Whether a firm is affiliated to a 
group or not is determined using a variety of sources like public announcements made 
by individual corporations and groups, and regulatory filings.
7 The data we analyze 
belong to the fiscal years 1998-2000. The period is relatively recent compared to 
earlier  published  studies  on  India.  The  final  sample  comprises  a  total  of  844 
companies of which 476 (56%) are non-group firms and 368 (44%) are group firms. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the firms in our sample. All variables 
used in this study are defined in the Appendix. To facilitate comparison, we present 
the information on non-group and group firms separately. We use both accounting 
and stock market-based performance measures, the descriptive statistics of which are 
presented in Table 1. The mean return on assets (ROA) of non-group (group) firms is 
13.98%  (13.42%)  while  the  median  ROA  of  non-group  (group)  firms  is  14.07% 
(14.00%).
8  These  differences  are  negligible  and  statistically  insignificant.  On  the 
other hand, the mean Q of non-group firms (1.35) is found to be significantly higher 
than that of the group firms (1.11). Khanna and Palepu (2000a) also find insignificant 
differences in ROA but significant differences in Q between non-group and group 
firms.  We  also  find  that  the  variability  of  profits  as  measured  by  the  standard 
                                                 
7 We also perform an independent check on group affiliation of 100 large Indian corporations and come 
to the conclusion that the classification made by the database is accurate.  
 
8 Outliers usually distort the analysis of financial statement data. Instead of eliminating them from the 
sample (which leads to a reduction in the number of observations), we winsorize the performance 
measures at their 1
st and 99
th percentile values.   20   
deviation of ROA and Q is higher among non-group firms than group firms. An F-test 
for  the  equality  of  variances  indicates  that  these  differences  are  also  statistically 
significant. 
Table 1 also presents information on the ownership structure of non-group and 
group  firms.  We  observe  that  non-group  firms  have  lower  percentages  of 
shareholdings by financial institutions (FINI) and non-financial corporations (CORP). 
These two categories of investors hold, on average, 6.21% and 24.35% of shares of 
non-group  firms,  respectively,  compared  to  12.28%  and  41.10%,  respectively  for 
group firms. The differences in both mean and median values with regard to non-
group  firms  are  statistically  significant.  A  decomposition  of  these  aggregate 
ownerships reveals that ownership by domestic financial institutions (DOMI) as well 
as  domestic  non-financial  corporations  (DOMC)  is  significantly  higher  in  group-
affiliated  firms.  The  average  ownership  by  domestic  financial  institutions  and 
domestic  corporations  in  non-group  firms  is  5.42%  and  21.86%  respectively, 
compared to 10.37% and 38.10% respectively for group firms. 
We also find that the fraction of shares held by directors and their relatives 
(DIR) is very low for group firms. For the non-group sample, the mean (median) 
director share holdings are 23.42% (20.79%) while, for group-affiliated firms, the 
corresponding values are as low as 7.87% (1.54%). This difference is due to the fact 
that group firms are substantially larger than independent firms. It is important to note 
that the low director shareholdings in group-affiliated firms do not reflect the actual 
degree  of  control  exercised  by  the  controlling  family.  Ownership  by  domestic 
corporations plays by far the most important role in this regard.   21   
Summary information on other control variables is also presented in Table 1. 
We  observe  that  there  are  statistically  significant  differences  in  these  variables 
between non-group and group firms. The average group-affiliated firm is much larger 
as can be observed from higher total sales. The median group firm is about four times 
larger than the median unaffiliated firm. Group firms are also much older and have 
substantially higher amount of debt. The median group firm is 24 years old compared 
to 15 years for the non-group firm. Similarly, the debt-equity ratio of the median 
group firm is 5.59 compared  to 2.17 for the median independent firm. Finally, it 
should also be noted that the sample of firms represents many different industries. The 
empirical analysis that follows controls for all these factors. 
6. Empirical results 
In  this  section,  we  present  and  discuss  the  results  obtained  from  different 
regressions. To determine whether group-affiliated firms over or under-perform, we 
estimate  specification  (1)  and  present  the  findings  in  Table  2.  Panel  A  reports 
regression results for performance as measured by ROA and Panel B presents those 
for Q. Since many factors other than group affiliation can influence firm performance, 
all  of  our  regression  models  include  several  control  variables.  We  use  the 
shareholdings by different categories of owners to control for the ownership structure 
effect, the log of the number of years since establishment to control for the age of the 
firm, the log of total sales to control for the firm size effect, and the ratio of total debt 
to total equity to control for the leverage effect. We also include industry dummy 
variables  to  control  for  industry-specific  influences  on  corporate  performance.  In 
total,  we  have  eight  regressions  that  have  different  configurations  of  group  and 
ownership variables.   22   
The results in Panel A show that the performance of group-affiliated firms is 
lower  than  that  of  unaffiliated  firms.  We  observe  that  in  each  regression,  the 
coefficient of the group dummy variable is negative and statistically significant. It 
indicates that after controlling for firm characteristics like ownership, size, leverage 
etc., group affiliation is negatively related with corporate performance. In regression 
Models (1) and (2), the estimated coefficients of the group dummy variable suggest 
that  group-affiliated  firms  have  about  3  –  4  percent  lower  profitability  than 
independent firms. 
Khanna  and  Palepu  (2000a)  report  earlier  that  the  performance  of  group-
affiliated firms differs with respect to the size of the group. Therefore, as an additional 
check, we examine separately the profitability of three categories of groups: small 
groups, medium-sized groups and large groups. The results of regression Models (3) 
and (4) show that the coefficient of each category of group variable is negative and 
statistically significant. The discount varies between 3 to 5 percent depending on the 
size of the group and the regression model. Thus, the empirical finding of a significant 
underperformance of group firms is pervasive regardless of group size differences. 
To assess whether the negative group affiliation/performance relationship is 
also  consistent  with  the  stock  market-based  measure  of  performance, we  perform 
additional regressions in which the dependent variable is Q. The regressions results 
are presented in Panel B. Group-affiliated firms have a significantly lower Q, as can 
be  observed  from  regression  Models  (5)  and  (6).  Similar  to  the  ROA  models 
presented earlier, we estimate Models (7) and (8) wherein groups are categorized into 
different  size  classes.  The  results  also  indicate  an  underperformance  of  group-
affiliated firms. The magnitude of decline in Q varies between 17 to 20 percent (in a   23   
sample in which the average Q is 1.24) depending on the model specification. These 
results confirm our previous finding from Panel A that firms affiliated to business 
groups exhibit lower performance, and thus, provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
This finding is also invariant to the exclusion of one or the other control variables. 
Apart from examining the performance of group-affiliated firms, the main aim 
of this study is to examine profit redistribution and its impact on group firms. In order 
to do so, we analyze the sample of group-affiliated firms separately. The results of 
regressions estimated using specification (2) are presented in Table 3. Since profit 
redistribution  is  facilitated  by  the extent  of control  exercised  by  business  group’s 
controlling  shareholders,  we  present  the  regression  results  with  /  without  various 
ownership  variables.  As  before,  these  regressions  also  control  for  other  firm 
characteristics and industry effects. We also control for two additional factors that 
could  be  major  determinants  of  the  performance  of  group  firms.  First,  Lins  and 
Servaes  (2002)  report  that  diversification  by  group-affiliated  firms  has  a  negative 
impact  on  performance.  Consequently,  to  control  for  the  effect  of  diversification 
among  group-affiliated  firms,  we  add  a  diversification  dummy  as  an  additional 
explanatory variable.
9 Second, one can argue that controlling shareholders of listed 
group firms might also favor profit redistribution to unlisted firms belonging to the 
same group. This could systematically reduce profitability of listed group firms. The 
problem  could  be  more  severe  as  the  number  of  unlisted  firms  within  the  group 
increases. We therefore add a new variable to capture this effect. We employ two 
constructs for this variable: a dummy representing the presence of unlisted firms in 
                                                 
9 A firm is considered as diversified if its total sales are spread over two or more two-digit segments 
and less than 90% of its sales accounts for one segment. 
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the group and the logarithm of the number of unlisted firms affiliated to a group. 
Since the findings are not different, we report results only for the second variable. 
We  obtain  the  following  empirical  results.  For  group-affiliated  firms,  we 
observe in Table 3 that the estimated coefficient of the interaction variable DOMC * 
ROA(-1) is negative and highly statistically significant. The finding indicates that a 
group-affiliated  firm  with  higher  (lower)  profit  in  one  year  experiences  a  profit 
reduction (improvement) in the following year.
10 The evidence is consistent with the 
fact that profit redistribution occurs among group-affiliated firms. It also shows that 
the  channel  facilitating  profit  redistribution  is  control  exercised  by  domestic 
corporations. The evidence provided here is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
11 
The  estimated  relationship  between  prior  period  profitability,  domestic 
corporate  ownership  and  current  period  profitability  is  depicted  in  Figure  1.  The 
figure portrays, using parameter estimates from Model (1), the profit redistribution 
effect at various levels of domestic corporate ownership. It clearly shows that at low 
levels of control the current period profitability is not materially different from that of 
the  prior  period.  However,  when  the  level  of  control  increases,  a  significant 
improvement in profitability takes place in case of firms with low prior profitability 
while a significant deterioration occurs for firms with high prior profitability.
12  
                                                 
 
10 Although  our hypothesis is  solely  concerned with  group-affiliated firms, one can argue that the 
observed reversion in profits can also take place among independent firms. To examine this possibility, 
we estimate regression specification (2) for the non-group sample, and find that the coefficient of the 
interaction variable is statistically insignificant. 
 
11 We also obtain similar results when we use Q as an alternative performance measure. This suggests 
that the effect of redistribution can also be captured by stock market-based variables. For reasons of 
brevity, we do not present these results. 
 
12 In  order to illustrate the economic importance of this effect further, we compute the change in 
predicted ROA at high and low levels of prior period ROA using the estimated coefficients at the mean   25   
Thus far, the results have shown that group-affiliated firms are characterized 
by the phenomenon of profit redistribution. In order to provide further evidence on the 
degree of profit redistribution (Hypothesis 3), we estimate specification (3) for all 
group  firms.  We  construct  three  variables  representing  different  group  sizes  to 
examine  the  influence  of  group  size.  We  also  decompose  aggregate  domestic 
corporate  ownership  into  three  variables  with  various  thresholds  to  examine  the 
influence of  different levels  of control.  Our  key interest now lies on the variable 
representing the interaction between domestic corporate ownership thresholds, lagged 
profitability and various categories of group size. The results are presented in Table 4.  
We observe that when we split the aggregate domestic corporate ownership 
variables into three separate thresholds (Model (1)), the profit redistribution effect is 
still  prevalent  in  all  three  categories  of  group  firms.  More  interestingly,  we  now 
observe  from  Models  (2)  and  (3)  that  the  coefficient  of  the  interaction  variable 
associated with the largest domestic ownership and the largest group size (DOMC3 * 
ROA (-1) * Group3) is negative and statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
two  interaction  terms  representing  small  and  intermediate  group  sizes  are  not 
statistical significant. It implies that firms that are affiliated with the largest business 
groups and that have the highest domestic corporate control experience severe profit 
redistribution. Overall, our finding is consistent with the Hypothesis 3.
13 
                                                                                                                                           
value of DOMC. For example, we find that the predicted ROA is lower (16%) when prior period ROA 
was higher (30%), while it is higher (–9%) when prior ROA was lower (–25%). 
 
13 The economic significance of this redistribution effect can be estimated by adding the corresponding 
regression coefficients while keeping the three DOMC variables at their respective mean levels. A 
graphical plot (not shown) depicts that the impact on the fitted values of ROA is quite striking. The 
redistribution effect also persists when we use alternative definitions of group size as discussed in 
footnote 4. 
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Next, we examine the efficiency of profit redistribution among group-affiliated 
firms (Hypothesis 4). If business groups allocate resources efficiently, high Q group 
firms should receive more funds, while low Q group-affiliated firms should not be 
subsidized.  We,  therefore,  expect  a  significant  positive  difference  in  capital 
expenditures  between  these  two  categories  of  group-affiliated  firms.  Independent 
firms are not subject to any distortion in internal resource transfers, and consequently, 
rely more on the external capital market. This should equivalently be reflected in a 
significant positive difference in capital expenditures between high Q and low Q non-
group firms. 
Both independent and group-affiliated firms are classified into two categories 
based on their  median Q values.
14  From the results  shown in Table  5, we  find a 
significant  difference  in  capital  expenditures  between  the  two  non-group  firm 
categories. The mean (median) capital expenditures for high Q non-group firms are 
10% (5.2%) which are significantly higher than those of corresponding low Q firms. 
On the other hand, the mean (median) capital expenditures of high Q group-affiliated 
firms  are  8.5%  (4.7%)  which  are  not  significantly  different  from  low  Q  group-
affiliated firms. The lack of a statistically significant difference in capital expenditures 
between high Q and low Q group firms indicates that large inefficiencies persist in the 
resource allocation of group-affiliated firms. The results do not provide support for 
Hypothesis 4. Since resource allocation of such nature represents a transfer of wealth 
from deserving firms to undeserving firms, it offers an explanation to the previously 
documented underperformance of group-affiliated firms. 
                                                 
14  We also split the sample using Q > 1 as the cut-off value and find qualitatively similar results.   27   
7. Conclusions 
The study contributes to the literature by documenting profit redistribution as 
an explanation for the performance difference of firms affiliated to business groups. 
We find that group-affiliated firms in India under-perform relative to independent 
firms: return on assets is 3 to 5% lower and Q is about 17 to 20% lower. This result is 
consistent with Campbell and Keys (2002), Ferris et al. (2003) and Joh (2003) who 
investigate the performance of firms affiliated to South Korean business groups, and 
Lins and Servaes (2002) who examine groups from several emerging countries.  
Apart from this general finding, we provide empirical evidence on resource 
transfers  among  group-affiliated  firms.  Our  analysis  shows  the  presence  of  a 
significant profit redistribution effect within business groups: group-affiliated firms 
with  higher  performance  subsequently  experience  a  significant  decline  in 
performance,  and  vice  versa.  We  then  seek  to  determine  whether  the  profit 
redistribution effect is related to the extent of control exercised by the controlling 
shareholders  and  the  size  of  the  business  group.  More  family  control  and  larger 
number of firms are expected to induce more resource transfers. We observe that 
firms that have high levels of control and that belong to the largest business groups 
are indeed characterized by severe profit redistribution. 
As domestic corporations controlled by family members play a significant role 
in managing firms affiliated with  business  groups, the driving force behind profit 
redistribution  is  likely  to  be  solidarity  between  these  shareholders.  An  interesting 
question is whether this solidarity interferes with sound economic decision-making 
and results in a sub-optimal allocation of resources. The evidence presented in this 
study  reveals  that  the  process  of  redistribution  among  business  group  firms  is   28   
associated with resources being transferred from higher performing firms to lower 
performing firms. Our finding shows that the utilization of resources by less deserving 
firms represents an important form of inefficiency among group-affiliated firms. We 
believe  that  this  inefficient  profit  redistribution  is  a  key  determinant  of  the 
underperformance of group-affiliated firms, and thus provides a major explanation for 
the observed ‘business group discount’.   29   
 
Appendix 
 Definition of variables 
 
ROA: Return on assets defined as the earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation over the 
book value of total assets 
 
Q: Market value of equity plus the book value of total debt over book value of total assets 
 
Group: Dummy measure of group affiliation which takes a value of one for a firm affiliated 
with a group and zero otherwise 
 
Group1: Dummy measure of group affiliation for groups with two or less listed firms 
 
Group2: Dummy measure of group affiliation for groups with three and four listed firms 
 
Group3: Dummy measure of group affiliation for groups with five or more listed firms 
 
FINI: Shareholding by foreign and domestic financial institutions 
 
CORP: Shareholding by foreign and domestic corporations 
 
FORI: Shareholding by foreign financial institutions 
 
FORC: Shareholding by foreign non-financial corporations 
 
DOMI: Shareholding by domestic financial institutions 
 
DOMC: Shareholding by domestic non-financial corporations 
 
DOMC1: Domestic corporate shareholding of less than 26% 
 
DOMC2: Domestic corporate shareholding of 26% and above but less than 51%  
 
DOMC3: Domestic corporate shareholding of 51% and above 
 
DIR:  Shareholding by directors and their relatives 
 
Age: Years since the incorporation of the firm 
 
Sales: Total sales of the firm 
 
Leverage: Defined as the ratio of total debt to equity capital 
 
Capex: Capital expenditures defined as the ratio of the difference between the purchase and 
sale of fixed assets over lagged value of total assets 
 
DIVDUM: Diversification dummy which takes a value of one if a firm’s sales are spread 
over two segments and less than 90% of it’s sales are in a single segment, and zero otherwise 
 
Unlisted: The number of unlisted firms affiliated to a group firm 
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Table 1 
 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the  summary  statistics  of  the  principal  variables used  in  the study.  The  sample 
consists of 476 non-group and 368 group firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. All variables are 
calculated for the fiscal year 1999-2000, and are defined in the Appendix. The asterisks *** and ** 
denote  that  the  mean  and  the  median  values  between  non-group  and  group  firms  are  statistically 




Non-Group  Group 
Variables 
Mean  Median   Std. Dev  Mean  Median.  Std. Dev. 
ROA (%) 
 
13.98  14.07  12.80  13.42  14.00  10.82 
Q ratio 
 
1.35**  0.80  1.74  1.11  0.79  1.19 
FINI (%)  6.21***  1.67***  9.42  12.28  9.63  11.93 
CORP (%)  24.35***  18.74***  20.65  41.10  41.98  21.20 
DIR (%)  23.42***  20.79***  19.59  7.87  1.54  13.20 
DOMC (%)  21.86***  16.17***  19.61  38.10  39.13  20.02 
DOMI (%)  5.42***  1.24***  8.45  10.37  7.01  10.48 
Sales 
(Mil. Rupees)  1,323***  409***  5,831  4,381      1,517  11,269 
 
Age 




3.70***  2.17***  4.66  7.11  5.59  6.15 
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Table 2 
 Regression results on the impact of group affiliation on firm performance 
 
This table reports the results of regression specification (1) in which the dependent variable is return on 
assets (ROA) in Panel A and Q in Panel B. The sample consists of 844 group and non-group firms. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The regression estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity 
using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance. Statistical significance is represented by the 
asterisks ***, ** and * which denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: ROA regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -21.560***  -25.648***  -21.806***  -25.768*** 
Group  -3.812***  -2.946**     
Group1      -3.291***  -2.615*** 
Group2      -4.381**  -3.234** 
Group3      -5.392***  -3.992*** 
FINI  -0.162***    -0.157***   
CORP  0.034*    0.038**   
FORI    0.003    -0.001 
FORC    0.118**    0.120*** 
DOMI    -0.127***    -0.120*** 
DOMC    0.074***     
DOMC1        0.100 
DOMC2        0.066** 
DOMC3        0.082*** 
DIR     0.110***    0.106*** 
Log Age  -0.178  -0.313  -0.116  -0.269 
Log Sales  3.883***  3.809***  3.904***  3.820*** 




Included  Included  Included  Included 
Adjusted R
2  0.225  0.242  0.226  0.240 
F-statistic  9.764***  9.703***  9.183***  8.616*** 
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  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept  -0.029  -0.109  -0.030  -0.253 
 
Group  -0.244**  -0.217**     
Group1      -0.246**  -0.248** 
Group2      -0.260**  -0.215* 
Group3      -0.213  -0.108 
FINI  0.009    0.009   
CORP  0.005***    0.005**   
FORI    0.053**    0.051** 
FORC    0.014***    0.014*** 
DOMI    0.001    -0.000 
DOMC    0.006**     
DOMC1        0.016** 
DOMC2        0.010*** 
DOMC3        0.006** 
DIR    0.003    0.003 
Log Age  -0.154  -0.121  -0.154  -0.131 
Log Sales  0.086*  0.067  0.085*  0.069 




Included  Included  Included  Included 
Adjusted R
2  0.338  0.353  0.336  0.353 
F-statistic  16.376***  15.865***  15.250***  14.158*** 
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Table 3 
 Regression results on profit redistribution among group-affiliated firms 
 
This table reports the results of regression specification (2) in which the dependent variable is return on 
assets  (ROA).  The  sample  consists  of  368  group-affiliated  firms.  All  variables  are  defined  in  the 
Appendix.  The  regression  estimates  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  using 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariances. Statistical significance is 





  (1)  (2) 
Intercept 
 
0.657  -4.295 
ROA (-1)  0.677***  0.651*** 
DOMC  0.066**  0.087** 
DOMC*ROA (-1)  -0.006***  -0.006*** 
FORI    -0.034 
FORC    0.128** 
DOMI    -0.037 
DIR    0.080* 
DIVDUM  0.153  0.311 
Log Unlisted  0.288  0.481 
Log Age  -1.463*  -1.128 
Log Sales  1.139***  1.407*** 
Leverage  -0.108  -0.134* 
Industry dummies
  Included  Included 
Adjusted R
2  0.422  0.433 
F-statistic  9.927***  9.248*** 
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Figure 1 
Profit redistribution in group-affiliated firms 
 
The figure plots the predicted return on assets (PrROA) from regression results presented in Model (1) of Table 3 using coefficients of previous period’s ROA 
(ROA (-1)), domestic corporate ownership (DOMC) and the interaction coefficient DOMC*ROA (-1). It shows how a firm’s previous period profitability is 














































 Regression results on profit redistribution with varying group sizes and corporate controls 
 
This table reports the results of regression specification (3) in which the dependent variable is return on 
assets (ROA). The sample consists of 368 group firms. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The 
regression  estimates  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  using  Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariances. Statistical significance is represented by 
the asterisks ***, ** and * which denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept 
 
-1.188  -1.413  -1.369 
ROA (-1) 
 
0.790***  0.501***  0.736*** 
Group2 
 
-1.020  -1.158  -1.308 
Group3 
 
-4.051***  -2.189*  -3.554** 
DOMC1 
 
0.183  0.076  0.195* 
DOMC2 
 
0.049  -0.010  0.064 
DOMC3 
 
0.103***  0.046**  0.108*** 
DOMC1*ROA (-1) 
 
-0.018**    -0.014 
 DOMC2*ROA (-1) 
 
-0.009**    -0.009** 
DOMC3*ROA (-1) 
 
-0.009***    -0.006*** 
DOMC1*ROA (-1)*Group1 
 
  -0.002  -0.004 
DOMC2*ROA (-1)*Group2 
 
  0.000  0.002 





0.168  0.444  0.406 
Log Unlisted 
 
1.629*  1.587*  1.740* 
Log Age 
 
-1.358*  -1.279  -1.327 
Log Sales 
 
1.286***  1.318***  1.260*** 
Leverage 
 
-0.139**  -0.135*  -0.137** 
Industry dummies 
 




0.439  0.428  0.444 
F-statistic 
 
8.965***  8.614***  8.506*** 
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Table 5 
 Capital expenditure differences between non-group and group firms. 
 
This table reports mean (median) Q and capital expenditures (Capex) of 424 non-group and 341 group 
firms classified into two categories based on their median Q values. The asterisks *** denotes that the 
mean and the median values between high Q and low Q firms are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The t-test is used to determine the equality of means whereas the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test is 




























       (0.052) 
 
1.607 






Low Q firms 
 
0.579 
       (0.610) 
 
0.064 
       (0.033) 
 
0.628 
      (0.654) 
 
0.073 















        (0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 